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Abs t r ac t
Thi s pap er examin es i rr ev ersi bl e d eci s i ons on in no v a ti v e activi ties w h ere i t ta k es
time to comple t e an R&D pro ject. The t ota la moun to fR & D i n v estmen t s that
the ￿ r m needs t o u ndertak ei no r d e rt oo btai n the breakt hrough in t he in n o v ation
pro cess is unc ert ai n. R& D i n v estmen ts are li mited b y the restricti o n that they
m ust b e se lf-￿n a n ced.
It is s ho wn t hat R&D in v estmen t sa r e mor ev a l uabl e w he n t he l ev el of un cert ai n t y
is la r ge. Esp eci a lly ,i ti sv ery a ttr acti v e to undertak e R &D in v estmen ts i f a pro jec t
faces man y u ncertain ti es du r in g i t s ea rl y ph a se s .F urt h erm ore w e study ho w R&D
b e ha vi or is in ￿uen ced b yd i ￿ eren tl e v el s of the d iscoun t rat e and the ￿nanc ing
l imi t .M o reo v er, t he e￿ ec t so f R&D subsi die s, spi ll o v er b ene ￿ts and a pa y o￿ that
dec r eases o v er time are anal yzed.
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1 In tro duc tion
Rec en ty ears ha v ew i tnessed the dev el op men t of a larg e lit era t u re a naly zing the i ncen-
tiv es fo r ￿rm st o p e rform inno v at i v e acti viti es. B eside s the larg e stream of m acro ec o-
nom ic publ icati o ns o n the so -c alled "endo genous gro wth theo r y" (see ,e . g., Rom er (199 0a ,
19 90 b), G rossm an a nd Hel pm an (1 990 , 1 99 1)), the re e xists a c o nsider a ble am oun to fm i-
cro econo m ic c on tributions th at can b e sub divi ded in stra te gic and de cisi o n-theoreti c
li terature. Th e strateg i c lite ra ture aim sa ti nno v at i ng b eha vi or o f ￿rm s whil e taki ng in to
accoun t the rea c tions o f co m pe titors. Thi s stre am of l ite ra ture fo cusses on a sp ects of
riv al ry ,t h us g am e - the or e tic ap proac hes (s e e, e.g., Rei ng an um (19 85 ) an d Tirole (19 88 )).
Withi n the deci sion- the o ret ic l ite ra ture on inno v ation, dyna m ic R &D i n v estm en ti s
treated a s an optim a l con trol pro bl em facing a single ￿rm . This k ind of analysis a p-
pli es m os t di rectl y to situations in w hi c ha m on op o l ist und e rta k es a re sear ch pro ject,
ane n treprene ur pursues a new p aten tw i tho ut riv alry ,o r ac om pe titi v e ￿rm see ks an
im pro v e dt e c hnolog y . Of pa rti cular im p ortan c e in the dec ision-th e or e tic fr ame w ork is
the a ssum ption t h at th e ￿rm b eli ev es i ts c ho i ce o f the lev el of R& D sp endi ng do es not
in￿uenc e the R&D sp e nd i ng of its ri v als . Th i s a ssum ption m a y b e justi￿e d when the re
are p erhaps m an yw a ys of ac hiev ing the s am e inno v ation, so that the ￿rm ’s riv als m a y
not b e i ni ts pre sen tl i ne of b usi ness (Kam i en a nd Sc h w artz (19 82 ), p. 1 07). Rec en tc on -
tri b uti on s wi thin this area a re Gro ssm an and Shapiro (198 6), Ma jd a nd P i ndyc k (198 7)
and Gi￿ord (19 92).
Be sides p e rfo rm ing R&D itse lf the ￿rm ha s the p oss i bil it yo fa t e c hno l og y trans f er, but
also then it needs to ha v e subs tan ti al i nho use capa c it yi n order to recognize ,e v al u ate,
nego ti ate an d ￿nall y ado pt the te c hnology p oten tiall ya v ailable fro m o t hers. M o reo v er,
inhouse R&D h as the ad di tiona l a dv an tag e o f faci li ta ti ng b etter i nfo rm at i on ￿ o w from
the R&D l a b o ratory to tho se who w ou l dh a v et o i m plem en t the n e w tec hnolog y , and
from the l atter to the form er. Therefore R &D gro wth ha s not led to a com para bl e
pro c ess of m ar ket-ba se dd i vi sio n of l abor an d t h e e m ergenc eo fs p e ciali zed "i nn o v ation
supp l ie rs ". Fi rm sm ak ei nno v at i on s l a rgel y on the b asis of i nho use t ec h nology ,b u tw i th
so m e con tributi o ns from o ther ￿rm s , and fr o m publi c kno wle d ge (Do si (198 8), p. 11 30 ).
The pu r p os e of this pa p er is to study o pti m al dyna m ic R&D b e ha vior o f a ￿rm wi thin
a deci sion theoretic fram ew ork. Com ple ting the pro jec t req uires i n v esting in R&D. The3
actua l tota l o f R&D in v estm e n ts tha t ne eds to b e undertak en to co m ple te the pro je ct
is ne g ativ el y correl at e dw i th the pre sen t and future prog ress m ade b y the ￿rm ’s R&D
lab o ratory . Since thi s pro gress i s ha rd to predic t, the cost to obta i n the inno v ation is in
general unkno wn. When after a whil e it turns out t ob e t o oe x p ensi v et oc o m ple te the
pro jec t, the ￿rm can stop i n v esting in it.
W e con c lude tha t a n R &D pro j ect ta k es ti m e to com ple te and i s s ub ject to cos t un c er-
tain t y . Pindyc k (19 93 ) disti ng uishes t w ot yp es of cos t uncertai n t y . T he ￿rst i st e c hnic al
uncert ain t yw h i c h relates to the ph ysic a l di￿ cult yo fc om pleti ng a pro je ct: ho wm uc h
tim e, e￿ort a nd m a ter ials wil l ulti m atel yb er e q uired. The second ki nd o f unc ertain t y
rel a te s to input cos ts, and i se xternal to what th e ￿ r m do es. It arises when th e p r ice so f
lab o r, l an d, a nd m aterial s nee ded to buil da p r o j e ct ￿uctuate cons i derab l y .
The cos t unce rta i n t yo fc o m ple ting an R&D pro jec ti s m ainly of th e tec hn i cal t y pe .
Therefore, since i n thi sc ontri bution w e expl ici tly w an t to fo cus on R&D i n v estm en ts ,
w ew i ll negle ct i np ut co st unc ertain t y .A sP i ndyc k (19 93) a rgues, tec hn i cal unc ertain t y
can only b e reso l v ed b y u nde rta ki ng the pro jec t; a ctual costs and c o nstructi o n tim e
unfold as the pro j ect pro c eeds. T he s e costs m a yb eg r ea te r o r less tha n an ti ci p ated i f
im p e dim e n ts arise or i f the w o rk pro gresses faster than planned, bu t the total c os t o f
in v e st men ti s o n l yk nown for ce rta i n when the pro je ct i sc om plete d. In the m o del sp ec i￿-
cation of Pindyc k (19 93), tec hnical unc ertain t y is the s am e fo r ea c h phas e o f t h e pro ject.
Ho w ev e r, i n the b eginni ng of a n R& Dp r oj ect o ne is usua l ly v e ry unc ertain ab out ho w
m uc ht i m e, e￿o rt a nd m at e rials wil lb en e e ded to com ple te the pro ject; in fact i ns o m e
cases it is not ev en k no wn wh e th e r the pro j ect ca n b e reali zed at all . This i m pli es that
tec hnic a l unce rta i n t yi sv ery large w he n the pro jec ti s far from b eing c om plete d. This
uncert ain t yw i ll reduce wh e ns o m e researc h ha s b een undert ak en, or, i n oth e rw ords ,
in v e s ti ng ti m e and e ￿ ort in the pro jec tr e v e als som ei nfor mat i o n ab out what exactl y
is neede dt od e v el o p the inno v at i on . H ence , the le v e lo ft e c hnical unce rta i n t yi s larger
in early phases of a n R&D pro je ct. Th e refore, i n thi s pap er w em o dify the m o del of
Pindyc k (19 93), where tec hn i cal unce rta i n t yi s the sam e for eac h phas e of the pro jec t, in
order to i ncl u de th e feature tha t w o rki ng on the pro jec tr educes the pro jec t’s uncertain t y .
In th e m o del R&D in v estm en ts are l im ited b y the restri ction that they m ust b e se lf-
￿na nc ed. A ccording to Kam i en a nd Sc h w artz (19 82 ) thi si sr e alisti c fo r the fo l lo wing
t w or e a sons . First, the unc ertain t y as so ciated wi th inno v ativ e acti viti es is strong , and4
b o rro wing fo r ri sky pro jects is prohibiti v e ly e xp e ns i v e( G e ro ski (1 99 2)) since th e o ut-
com e of a risky pro ject is unce rta i n and w he ni t f a i ls i tl ea v e sb e hind fe w ta ngibl e ass e ts .
Sec o nd, the ￿rm m a yb er e l uctan tt or e v e a l detail ed i nfo rm at i on abou t t h e p r o j e ct that
w ould m ak e it attra c tiv e to o utsi de l enders, fe ar i ng its di sclosure to p oten tial riv als
(Kam i en a nd Sc h w a rtz (1 98 2), p. 1 28). Th e s e o bserv ations are supp orted b y anec d ot-
ic a l evi dence and an e m piri cal study of Guerard , B ean and A ndrews (198 7) who f o und
out that there is a l ac k of statisti cal s i gn i ￿cance of R &D and e xternal funds.
Be sides determ ini ng the e￿ec ts of the am oun t o f unce rta i n t y , the div ision o f unc ertain t y
accross the di￿ere n t phas e s o f the pro ject , the le v e lo ft h e d i scoun t rate and the ￿nancing
restri ction on R&Di n v estm en ts, w e also a naly ze t h e e￿ec ts o f three c hara c teri st i cs that
are t ypic a l for i nn o v ation pro jec ts. First, w e study the e￿ect o f a n i n v estm e n t gra n t. This
gra n ti s don ated to the ￿rm b y the go v e rnm en ti n order to stim ulate inno v ativ ea c tivi tie s.
Sec o nd, w e a naly ze w hat happ e ns wh e n spil lo v er b ene ￿ ts exi s t. Exi stence o f spill o v er
b ene￿ts cap ture s the fact that kno wledge is a nonriv al i np ut (Rom e r (199 0a)) i n the
sense tha t s e v e ra l ￿rm sm a y put the sa m e inform ation to use sim ultaneou sl y at n o extra
cost. H ere, the ￿rm tak e s adv an ta ge of the m ore general form s of scie n ti￿c a nd e ng i neer-
ing kno wledge generated o utsi de t h e ￿rm b y com p etitors o r univ ersiti es.
Third, w e ana l yze the e ￿e c t tha t a d e creasing v alue of a com pl eted inno v at i on o v er tim e
can ha v e o n the ￿rm ’s inno v ativ e activ iti es. This v alue i s equal to the pa y o￿ tha t ac-
crue s to the ￿ rm after the i nno v at i o n pro ject is c om plete d. This p a y o￿ can decre as e o v er
tim e, b e caus e , ￿rst, the so on e r t he ￿r m p e r f ects the devi ce, the longer is th e t im e p eri od
that it captures m o n opol y ren ts . Second, the n um b e ro fc o m p eti to rs tha t al rea dy h as
ac hi ev ed the breakthroug h in the i nno v at i o n pro c ess wi ll i ncrease o v er tim e, i m pl ying
that c om pe t ition in the m ark e t o f the inno v ated pro duct a l so inc reas e so v er tim e.
In Sec tion 2 w e dev elop the m o del, while the op ti m al i n v estm en t rule i sd e riv ed in Se ction
3. He re w ea l so stud y ho w R&D i n v e st men ts dep end on the am oun t o f uncer ta i n t y , the
div ision of unce rta i n t ya c cross the phas e s o f the pro je ct, the le v e l of the discoun t rate,
and th e a v ailabil it y of fund s. Sec tion 4 tre a ts the e￿ e cts of a n R& Di n v estm en tg r ant,
spil lo v er b e ne￿ts and a decre a sing pa y o￿ . The pa p er is concl ud e di nS e cti on 5.5
2 The Basi c Mo del
The proble mo f d e term i ning optim al R&D i n v e stm en ts o v er tim ei s a seque n tial in v est-
m e n t problem . An R &D p ro je ct tak es tim et oc o m pl ete, b ec a use duri ng som e tim e
in v e s tm en ts i nm ac hines, m aterials, h um an capital , etc ., a r e nee ded in o rde rt od e v elop
the inno v ation. T he pro je ct g e nera t es no cas h ￿o wa sl o n ga si ti s not c om plete d.
An R&D pro jec ti s s ub ject to tec hnical uncertain t y since it is not k no wn b e f or e h and
ho wm uc h tim e, e￿o rt a nd m aterial s wil lu l tim at e ly b e re quire dt oc o m pl ete the pro ject.
Ho w ev e r, ev ery ti m e the ￿rm in v ests, s om e inform ation ab out these future cos t si s re-
v ealed. When, bas e d on this new inform ation, the ￿rm concl ud e s t h a ti ti s t o o e xp e ns i v e
to c om plete the pro je ct, i tc a n b e s topp ed m idstream .
Denote the actua l to tal of R&D in v estm e n ts needed to com ple te the pro jec ta tt i m e t b y
~
K (t). Due to the te c hni cal unce rta i n t y
~
K i s a rand om v ar i ab l et ha t c a nnot b e observ ed
at ti m e t. Wha t is kno wn at this ti m ei s the ￿rm ’ se x pe ctation ab out h o wm an y R&D
in v e st men ts are needed to o btain the inno v ation, whic hi s equal to K ( t)= E (
~
K (t)). In
order tom ak e things no t to o c om plic at e d, the v al u e o f a succ essful i nn o v ation, P ,i s
as sum e d t ob ec o nstan t a nd kno wn wi th c ertain t y .
In P i ndyc k (19 93) a g e neral seq uen ti al i n v e st men t p roble m (so, not only R&D but also ,
e. g.,l arg e cons truc tion w orks) is fo rm ulated sub je ct to i npu t cos t uncertain t y and te c h-
nic a l unc ertain t y .H e m o del led tec hnic a l unc ertain t y in the fo l lo wi ng w a y:






dw (t ); (1)
where I (t) is the in v estm en ta tt i m e t , ￿ i s a param ete r that is con stan to v e r tim e and
dw (t ) is the incre m en t of a Wie ner pro ce ss .
The pro je ct m a nag e r estim at e s the e xp ecte d cos t to com ple tion, but due to th e sto c ha s-
tic term this v alue wi ll b e a djusted o v er ti m e. This adjustm en ti s b a s e d o n acti viti es
in dev el op i ng the pro ject. There fo re , K can only c ha nge when t h e ￿rm under ta k es
so m ei n v estm en ts . Thi si sb e caus e a s l o ng as the ￿rm d o es no t in v est i n the pro je ct
no a dditi on al inform ation abou t t h i s pro j ect b ecom e sa v ailable, s o that no thi ng cha nges
ab out the ￿rm ’s exp ectation c o nce rning future cos ts. He nce, h e re th e re i sn o" v alue o f6
w aiti ng ".
1
When the ￿ rm i n v ests, the exp ecte dc han ge in K o v er an i n terv al ￿t e quals ￿ I ￿ t, but
the re aliz ed c hange can b e g re at e ro rl ess tha n thi s , and K can ev en inc reas e .A s the
pro jec t pro c eeds, p r o gress wil la t t i m es b e sl o w er a nd a t tim es fa ster than ex pe cted. The
v ariance o f
~
K fall sa s K fa l ls, but the a c tua l tota l am oun to fi n v estm en ts is only kno wn
when the pro j ect is com pl eted.











He nce, the v ariance of d K=K inc reas e sl inearly wi th I= K . This m e a ns tha t, if for dif-
fere n t v alue so f K a ￿xe d pa rt o f the exp ecte d tota l of i n v e stm en ts is undertak en (i .e.
I =K is cons tan t), then the unc ertain t yc o n c erning the p art tha t the ex pe c ted to tal of
in v e st men t is reduce di s consta n t to o. Ther efore, under equation (1) it ho l ds that te c h-
nic a l unc ertain t y is the s am ef o r all phas e s of the pro j ect.
Ho w ev e r, for an R&D pro jec ti t is in general the case that unc ertain t yi sm uc h larger
during earl y phas e s o f the pro je ct; a t t h e sta r t it is usua l ly no t kno w n at al lh o wm uc h
tim e, e ￿ ort a nd m aterials will ul tim at e ly b e re quire dt od e v e lop the inno v ation, whil e
in the e nd i ti sm oreo rl ess c lear wh at is le ft to b e do ne .T h i si m pli es tha t te c hnic al
uncert ain t yi s l arg e r when K is l a rge tha n when K i sl o w. Henc e, to m ak e expression
(1) suitable fo r m o del li ng R&D in v estm en ts, w em us t m o dif yi ts u c h that the v ar i an c eo f
dK =K is i ncreasing in K i f a ￿xed part of the ex pe cted total of in v e st men t is undertak e n.
Therefore, w e repl a ce expression (1 ) b y









where ￿ i s a p ositi v e consta n t . W ec o n c lude tha t no wt e c hni cal unc ertain t yi sm uc h
larger during e ar l y pha ses o f the pro jec t (i. e. K i sl a rge) if ￿ is larg e .
1
In c a s e ther e i s a p ositiv ev al ue of w ai ting it is i m pl ied that und ertaking i n v es tm en ts no wi n t ro duce s
opp ortunit y cos ts th a ta r e igno re d i n t he cl ass i cal ne t pre se n tv a lue (NPV) rul e . This fai lure of t he
NPV c ri t erion form s the k ey m ess ag eo f a s tream o f rec en tc o n tr i butions i n whic hi t is argued that, due
to this p o sitiv e option v a lue o f p os tp oni ng in v e stm en t , a pro je ct with a p o sitiv eN P Vm i gh ts t i ll b e
une conom ical (s ee e.g . Dix it and Pi nd y ck ( 1 994)).7
F or re a sons already sta te d in the In tro duction, R&D in v estm e n ts c an on l y b e ￿na nc ed b y
retaine d earnings. I fw e de￿ne R (R> 0 and consta n t ) as the ￿rm ’s pro￿t ￿o w b efore the
breakthroug h in the i nno v at i o n pro c ess , I (t )i sr estricte d fro m a b o v eb y R . Knowl edge
acqui s i tion i sa l s o irrev ersi ble, s o the R&D i n v estm en t at tim e t faces the cons train t
0 ￿ I (t) ￿ R: (4)
If w e de￿ne the di scou n t rate to b e r (r> 0 and c o nsta n t), the p roble m is to ￿nd a
stream o f R&D o utl a ys that m axim ize s the v alue o f the i nn o v ation o pp o rtuni t yg i v e nb y



















sub jec t to expre ss i o ns (3 ), (4)and K (
~
T ) = 0.
Unc ertain t yi sr e l at e d to the pro gress m ad e in com ple ting the R &D pro jec t. T hi sk ind
of u nc ertain t y results from the inabil it y to predi ct ho w di￿ cult a pro ject wil l b e, and
this has no thi n g to do wi th the sta te of the o v erall econo m y . There fo re ,i no u r m o del
uncert ain t yi sl a rgel y div ersi￿able, s o tha t the discoun t rate equals the riskl ess rate.
In the next secti on w es o l v e the ba si cm o del and study ho w sensiti v e R&D in v estm e n ts
are with re spe c t to the divi sion o f unc ertain t y accross d i ￿eren t phases o f the pro jec t, the
o v erall lev el o f uncertain t y , the di scou nt ra te a nd the a v ailabil it y o f fund s. M o reo v er,
in Sec tion 4 w ee xtend this m ode lb yi ncl ud i ng som ec ha racte ristic s that a re t ypic al
for a n R& Di n v estm en t pro bl em , suc ha si n v e stm en t s ubsidi es, spill o v er b e ne￿ts a nd a
dec reas i ng pa y o￿ o v er ti m e.
3 Solv ing the Bas ic M o del
Sinc e the ex pe cted pro gress i n the inno v ation pro c ess as w el la st h ec o sts of i n v estm e n t
dep end l inearl yo n I , the pro bl em w i ll ha v e a " bang -ba ng" so l ution. A ta n y p oin ti nt i m e
the o pti m al R&D i n v e stm en t wil lb ee i ther 0 o r R . A sar e su l t, the o pti m al i n v estm e n t
rule reduce st o ac riti cal cuto￿ v alu e for th e exp ec ted to tal o f R&D i n v e stm en t s that
stil l nee d s to b e undertak en to c om plete the p ro je ct, K
￿
,s u c h tha t when K ￿ K
￿
, the8
￿rm in v e s ts at the m axim um ra te R, and the re is no R&D in v estm e n t o the rw i se.
As m en tioned i n the prev ious secti on , prog r ess m ade in o btaini n g the i nno v at i o n is v e ry
unli k e ly to dep end o n the s tate of the o v erall e con om y . Thi si m pli es that i ti s not
p o ssible to repl icate m o v em e n ts in dw with s om eo t her as set so rd y na m i c p ortfo l io of
as sets. Therefore w es o l v e the R&D i n v e stm en t prob l em b y using dynam i c progra m m ing
in stead of con ti n gen tc laim s ana l ysis a s w as don e in, e. g., Pindyc k (19 93).
T o a ppl yd y na m i c pro gra m m i ng w e start b y writi ng do wn the B el lm an e quation (see,
e. g., Dixi t a nd Pindyc k (19 94 )):






E [ dF ]
￿
: (6)
Due to I to ’ sl em m aw e obta i n that





















d w : (7)
Subs t itution o f ( 7) i n to (6) le a ds to the conclusi o n that F (K )m us t satisfy the fo l lo wing

















Be caus e eq ua ti o n (8 ) is line ar i n I , the o pti m al R&D in v e st men t tha t m axi m iz es F (K )



















Equation (8 ) the refore has a fre e b o undary at a p o i n t K
￿
, suc h that I (t )= R when
K ￿ K
￿
and I (t ) = 0 otherwise. The v alue of K
￿
i s fou nd al o ng with F (K )b ys o l ving
(8) sub je ct to the foll o wing b o undary cond i tions.
Fi rs t, the pa y o￿ after com pl etion is P ,s ow h e n K =0 w eh a v e
F (0) = P: (1 0)9
Sec o nd, i t holds tha t when K i sv ery l a rge, it is no t pro￿ table to b e gint h e pro je ct:
li m
K !1
F (K )=0 : (1 1)
As w eh a v e seen it is optim a l to ha v ez ero i n v e stm en t for K> K
￿
.F rom (8) w e obtain
that then the v alue o f the pro jec t F is ze ro a s w el l. Thi sc an be e xplaine db y the fact
that no new i nfo rm at i o n ab out the pro je ct wil l b e generated as l o n ga st h e re i s no R&D
in v e st men t. So, i f the ￿rm at one ti m e concl ud e s that the pro ject is to o ex pe ns i v e for
p erform ing R&D i n v estm e n ts, thi s conclussion wil la l so be d r a wn i n the f utu re b ecause
no i n v e stm en ti m pli es that K rem ains consta n t( c f. (3)), whic hi nt u r ni m pli es that
K rem ai ns l a rger than K
￿
.T h e refore, the ￿rm forev er refrains from in v esti ng so that
the pro j ect will nev er b e com pl eted. This l eads to the co nc lusion that the v alue of the
pro jec te q ua l s zer o. N o w, th e v alue m atc hing conditi o n, whi c h requi res that F should
b e con tin u ous i n K ,b e co m es
F (K
￿
)=0 : (1 2)
Sinc e F (K ) = 0 for K> K
￿
,w e kno w that F
0
(K )e qua l sz e ro a s w e ll for K> K
￿
.





)= 0 : (1 3)
When K< K
￿
and I = R, equation (8) is a s e cond order ordinary di￿eren tial equation
that m us t b e solv ed n um eri cally tog e ther wi th the b ounda ry conditi o ns (10), (11), (1 2)
and (13 ). This is do ne for v ar i ou s p ar a m e ter v alues in the rem ainde r of this s e cti on .
W eh a v e see n b efore tha t the ￿rm in v e st s m axim ally i n R&D a s long as the exp ec ted
tota l of R&D i n v estm en ts needed to com ple te the pro ject, wh i c hi sd e n oted b y K ,i s b e -
lo w K
￿
, a nd in v ests nothing otherwise. W e concl ude that the optim a l R&D i n v estm e n t
pol icy i sc om plete ly ￿xe db y K
￿
. Henc e, in ord e r to ￿nd out in wh at w a y di￿ere n tp a -
ram ete rv al uesa ￿ e ct R&D in v estm e n ts, it is su ￿ ci en tt o d e term i ne the rel at i on b e t w e en
K
￿
an d these para m eters.10
Fi rs t, w e study the e￿ect of the o v er al l uncertain t yl e v e l o n R&D in v estm e n t. F rom
eq u ati o n (3) w e o btain that the para m eter ￿ determ ines the lev el o f uncertain t y; un c er-
tain t yi s pa rti cul ar l y signi￿c an tw h e n ￿ i s large. H ence to ￿nd the e￿ e ct of unc ertain t y
on R&D i n v estm en ts w em u st plot K
￿
a gainst ￿ , whic h is do ne in Figure 1 fo r the pa -
ram ete r v alues r =0 : 05 ;R =2 a n d P =1 0 . W e see tha t K
￿
has the l o w est v alue when
uncert ai n t y is absen t. Th i sv alue o f K
￿
i s o btaine db y a pply ing the classical NPV rule.
When unce rta i n t y com e si nK
￿
i n c re a ses so that for eac h ￿> 0 the re ex ists an in te rv al
of K -v alue s where the cl a ssic a l NPV rul e tel ls the ￿rm to do n othing whil ei ti si n fact
optim al to in v e st m axi m al ly . T he NPV rul e also fail s in o the r sto c ha sti ci n v estm e n t
m o dels, and this fo rm s the k ey m essag e of a stre a m of re cen tc on t ributions i n whic ha n
a n a l o g yw i t ht h et heo ry of o pti o ns in ￿na nc ial m ark e ts i se x ploited in order to pro vi de
a m uc h ric her dynam ic fram e w or k than w a s po ss i bl e within the tra di tiona l the or y o f
in v e st m en t. A ni m p orta n t exp onen to ft h i sl ite ra ture is Dix it and Pindyc k (19 94). In
these m o dels in v estm en t decre a ses with uncertain t y , b ecaus e t h e pre se nce of unc ertain t y
m ak es i t v aluab l et o w ai t for m ore i nfo rm at i on abo ut ,e . g. , the price of output, b e fore
com m itti ng y oursel f t oa ni n c reas e dc ap i ta l s to c kl ev el.
[ PlaceF i gu r e 1 abou t here ].
W e co nc lude th at usually in v e st m en t decre a ses wi th uncertain t y , whil e from F igure 1
w e infer that i n o ur m o del it i s the o the rw a y round . The re a son li es in the t yp e of
uncert ai n t y , whi c hi st e c hni ca l uncertain t y her e ra the r tha n uncer ta i n t y ab o ut pric es
and reg ul at i on s. Theref or e ,i n the ￿rst place there is no v al ue of w ai ting b ecaus e new
inform ati o n a b ou t the pro je ct a rri v e s only when the ￿rm in v ests. Sec o nd, i f unc ertain t y
is larg e then the re i s a lot of unce rta i n t yt ob er e s olv ed w hi c h can b e don e b yi n v e st i ng .
In o ther w o rds, when R&D i n v estm e n ti s unde rta k en the ￿rm l earns abou t ho wm an y
m a teri al s, m anp o w e r, et c., a re requi red to com pl ete t h e pro ject , a nd the m ore unc ertain
the ￿rm i s ab out the se m a tte rs , the m ore there is to learn. Obta i nm en to ft h i si nf or m a-
tion giv es R &D in v estm en ta ne xtra v alue b ey ond its c on tribution to c om pl eti on of t h e
pro jec t. In ab se nc e o f uncer ta i n t y thi s extr av al ue is z ero b ec a use ev erythi ng is a l ready
kno wn. But the l a rger the u nc ertain t y is, th e larg e r the ex tra v alue wi ll b e, a nd, hence,
the m ore the ￿rm wil li n v e st i n R&D.
As ex pl ained in the prev ious sect ion , fo r R&D pro bl em s in particul ar i t holds tha t te c h-
nic a l uncertain t yi s esp ec iall y large i nt h e sta rti ng phas e o f t h e pro ject, th us wh e n K is11
large. W em o del led this b y a ddi ng a term K
￿
in the uncertain pa r t of th e state equation
for K (c f. ( 3 )). He nce, the l a rger i s ￿ , the larg e r is th e tec hnic a l unce rta i n t y during e ar l y
pha se s of the pro je ct. In Fi g ure 2 i ti ss h o wn in wh at w a y K
￿
dep ends on ￿ .
[ PlaceF i gu r e 2 abou t here ].
W ec o ncl ude that R&D in v estm e n ts incr ea se w i th ￿ . This is for the sam er e a son as
wh yi n v estm en t incre a sed w i th ￿ :i f the re i sal o t o f uncertain t y , then m uc h unc ertain t y
disapp e a rs when R&D in v estm en t is undertak en whic h giv e sal a rge extra v alue to R&D
in v e st m en t. F rom Figure 2 w e o btain tha t the para m eter ￿ ha s a n e no rm ou s e ￿e ct on
R&D i n v estm en ts : thi s e￿ect is m uc h larg e r tha n the e ￿e c t of the o v e ra l l unc ertain t y
para m eter ￿ . He nc e, i g noring ￿ le a ds to a large undere st i m ation of K
￿
, whi c h i n turn
w ould le a d to to o few R&D i n v estm e n ts.
The im pli ca t ion of this i s that it i s usually o pti m al to s p end so m e resou r ces o n e xploring
opp ortunitie s that a re com ple tely ne w (th us ha vi n gal arg e te c hni cal uncertain t y) to
the ￿rm . Bas e d o n the conclusi o ns of this ￿rst expl o rati o n phas e the ￿rm can deci de
to con ti n ue or aba ndon the pro jec t. In thi sw a y the ￿rm can dete ct those i nn o v ation
pro jec ts th at at ￿rst sigh t do no t lo ok as pro ￿table a s they reall y are. It can b e m uc h
easier to c om plete an inno v at i o n th an one w ould thi nk b eforeha nd. I f the opp osite is
true the ￿rm ca n just sto p i n v e sting b efore l oo s i ng to o m uc hm oney . Noti ce that ￿ b eing
large i m pli es that a l o t of un c ertain t yi sr eso l v e dd u r i ng a ￿rst e xplora ti o n p hase. This
is i nc on tr a st with the situation w he re ￿ is larg e ,b e c a use then unce rta i n t y rem ains large
during th e s uc cessiv e pha ses o f the pro je ct.
Fi gu r e 3 sho ws h o w K
￿
depe n ds on the discoun t rate for the cas e where uncertain t yi s
abs e n t( ￿ =0 ) a n d ￿ =1 . A s w eh a v e just s e en, R&D i n v estm en t rises with i ncre a sing
uncert ai n t y . This is c o n￿rm e di n Figure 3 wh e re K
￿
i ncreases with ￿ for a giv en v al ue
of r .
[ Place Fi gu r e 3 abou t here ].
Lo o k ing at the t w o cases i n Figure 3 w e see that R&D i n v estm en ti s d e creasing with the
discoun tr a t e .I n t he c e rta i n t y case R&D i n v estm e n t tak e s place a c cord i ng to the N PV
rule , whic hi m pli es that th e ￿rm i n v ests m axi m ally when the n e t pre se n tv al u e of the
pro jec t, wh i c hi s giv en b y12
Pe







dt ; (1 4)
is no n-nega ti v e
2
. T he pro jec t’s net pre sen tv al ue fa l ls w he n the discoun t rate r ises and
this m eans tha t also R&D i n v e stm en t wil lf a l l, as is re ￿ecte d in Figure 3 . F rom this
￿gu re w e can also c on c lude tha t thi sN P V e￿ e ct carrie so v er to the unce rta i n t yc a se.
Sum m ar i zing the ab o v e, w e concl ude that a n incre a sing d i scoun t rate ha s a nega ti v e
e￿ec t on R&D i n v estm en t, b e caus e the pro je ct’s net presen tv alue dec reases wi th r .
In gener a l a n R&D pro jec ti se n t irel y sel f ￿na nce d( G u e ra rd, Be a n and Andrews (19 87 )).
Reaso ns for this are that, ￿rst, outs i ders are rel uctan tt oi n v est m on e y in a pro jec t from
whic h the pro ce eds a re v ery u nc ertain. H ence, to b e ab l e to b orro w th e ￿rm m us t pa ya
h i g h in terest rate to com pe ns ate the un c ertain t y , and th i sm ak e s b o rro wi ng an un attrac-
tiv em eans of ￿na nc e. S e cond, the ￿ rm do es not w an tt o r e v e a l inform ation abou t a n
R&D pro je ct to the o utside w orld whic hm ust b e do ne in case of exte rna l ￿nancing
(Kam i en a ndS c h w artz (1 982 )). Ther efore, it i sl ik el y tha t the a v ail ab i li t y of fund s for
an R&D pro je ct i sl im i ted b y the pro￿t ￿o w obta i ned fr o m oth e ro p e ra ti on s w i thin the
￿rm . Figure 4 sho w s in w hat w a yt h i s ￿nancing l im it in￿uenc es the ￿rm ’ s R&D in v est-
m e n tb e ha v ior in the certain t y case a s w el l as when uncertain t y is presen t.
[ Place Fi gu r e 4 abou t here ].
When uncer ta i n t y is a bsen ta n dK i sb e l o wK
￿
,t h e com ple tion tim e of the pro jec ti s
K = R .T h i si m pl ie s th at when R is v ery larg e it i s p oss i ble fo r th e ￿rm to com pl ete the
inno v ation pro je ct a l m ost i m m e diatel y . Consequen tly , the op ti m al in v e st m en t dec ision
is to in v est when K fall sb e lo w the pro ject ’s pa y o￿ P , an d do no thi n g when K> P .
In F igure 4 this is c o n￿rm e db y the fact that fo r ￿ =0 K
￿
approa c hes an h ori zon ta l
as y m ptote, situated a t the l ev el P = 10, fro m b el o wa sR incre a ses.
When R i sl o w the com pl eti on t i m e is larg e and v e ry se ns i tiv et ot he l ev el o f R . This
im pli es th at the pro jec t’s n e t presen tv alue (see e qua t ion (14)) de pe nd s v ery hea vi ly on
R to o, so that the ￿rm ’s optim al in v estm e n t b eha vi or c hang e sv e ry m uc hw i th R .I n
Fi g ure 4 w e see tha t a sm all i nc reas e of R l eads to a l a rge incre as e of K
￿
as l on g as
2
Noti c e that the p ro ject ’ sc o m pletion t i m ei sk n o wn whe n unce rtai n t yi sa b sen t. It is T = K= R .13
the com ple tion ti m e K
￿
=R is m ore th an a ppro xi m ately 4
1
2
y e a rs. W e concl ude that the
presenc e of a ￿na nci ng lim it i s pa rti cul ar l y sensiti v e to the l ev el of R& Di n v estm e n t
when there is no t m uc h funds a v ail ab l e.
Fi g ure 4 s ho ws that also in the uncertain t yc a s ei th o l d s that the cri tical le v el K
￿
is
particul ar l y sensi tiv e to the lev el of the ￿nanci ng l im it when R i ss m al l. The di￿erenc e
with the certai n t y ca se is that K
￿
i s m uc h higher, esp eci al ly wh e n R i s large. The
reaso n is tha t a l o t o f unce rta i n t yi s resolv ed wh e n I i sl a rge (rem em be r that I = R for
K< K
￿
). This giv es a large extra v al ue fo r R&D in v estm en t.
4 Mo d el e xtens ions
In this s e cti on w e exte nd the ba si cm o del s o t ha t w e can ana l yze the e￿ec ts that thre e
c ha racte ristic s, wh i c h are t y pical for a n i nn o v ation pro ject, ha v eo no p t i m al R&D in-
v estm en ts o f the ￿rm .W e start ou t w i th inc luding in v e st m en t gran ts in the m o del , and
pro c eed w i th studyi n g the e ￿e cts of spi llo v er b e ne￿ts and a dec reasing pa y o￿, resp e c-
tiv el y .
4.1 R & D dep endi ng o n the l ev el of the i n v est m e n tg r a n tr a t e .
Som eg o v ernm en ts ha v ei n tro duced in v estm e n t g ran ts as a m eans to stim ulate R&D ac-
tiv iti es b y the ￿rm .T os e e whether this ￿nds c o n￿rm ation in ou r m o del ,i tm ust turn
out tha t for som el ev el so f K the ￿rm wil l not in v e st i n R&D without o btaini ng an
in v e st m en t g ran t, wh i le it wi ll do so a f ter i n v e st m en t g ran ts are i n tro duce d. In other
w ords , i tm ust b e the c a se that K
￿
i ncreases d ue to the in tro duction o f an i n v estm e n t
gran t .
If w ed e n ote the i n v e stm en t g ran t rate b y g (0 <g <1 ), the v alue o f the i nn o v ation
opp ortunit y , whic hi n the basic m o del i s giv en b ye q ua ti o n (5), c h anges i n to



















In thi s expre ss i on i t is re￿e cted that i f the R&D i n v e stm en ta tt i m e te qua l s I (t ), the
go v e rn m en tp a y s gI ( t ) to the ￿ rm so that the ne t R &D exp enses o f the ￿rm e qua l
(1 ￿ g )I (t). The ￿ nanci ng re s tri cti o n (4) i m pli es tha t the m axi m um R&D in v estm e n ta t14
tim e t eq ua l s R= (1 ￿ g ).
Fi rs t, let us cons i der the determ ini st i c case. As b e fo re a le v el o f ex pe cted tota l of R&D
in v e st m en ts to b e unde rta k en b efore co m plet ion K
￿
c an be d e ￿ned, a b o v e whic hi t i s
o p t i m a l n ot to i n v est a nd b el o w whic h th e ￿rm i n v ests m ax i m all y . This im pl ie s tha t for
K< K
￿
, K re du c es with R= (1 ￿ g ) p er uni t o f tim e so tha t th e com pl etion ti m e equals
(1 ￿ g )K= R .I fw e s ubstitute thi si n to (15) w e can deri v e tha t
F (K (t)) = e










The c riti cal lev el K
￿
can b e determ ined b y equating the m arginal b ene ￿t of R& D in-





)=1 ￿ g: (1 7)
Equations (16 ) and (17) i m ply t ha t K
￿
m u st sa ti sfy












W e con c lude tha t (1 ￿ g )K
￿
i s cons tan t s o that K
￿
is an i ncreasing functi on of g . This
functi on i s dra wn in Fi g ure 5, in whic hi ti sd e n oted b y ￿ = 0 (th e certain t yc a se). N ote
that (1 ￿ g )K
￿
e xactly eq ua l s the part of the accum ulated R &D in v estm en tt ha t m ust
b e pa i db yt h e ￿rm .
[ Place Fi gu r e 5 abou t here ].
In F igu r e5w e also ￿ nd K
￿
a s a function of g in case uncert ai n t y is presen t, w he re
￿ =1 : 0. I t turns o ut that on this curv e( 1 ￿ g ) K
￿
i si ncreasing, w hi c h can b e c o ncl uded
from the ￿gure d ue to the fact tha t the c urv e for ￿ =1 l i es ab o v e the dotted li ne on
whic h( 1 ￿ g )( K
￿
j
g =0 ; ￿ =1
) is consta n t . T he reas on com e s fro m the e ￿e ct that g ha s on
the v ariance of dK when the ￿rm i n v ests m ax i m all y in R&D. Then I = R= (1 ￿ g ) and
from eqn. (3) w e o btain that for I = R= (1 ￿ g )i t holds tha t




R= (1 ￿ g ): (1 9)15
W e conclude tha t v ar ( dK ) incre a ses w i th g ,w h i c h is due to the fact that I = R= (1 ￿ g )
inc reas e s with g , a nd the larger the R&D i n v estm en ti s, th e m o re unc ertain the ￿rm is
ab out the outcom e . I f the lev el o f uncert ai n t yi sl a rge, the nm uc h unce rta i n t yd i sa p-
p ea r s when R&D in v estm e n t is und e rta k en, b ec a use, a s a l ready a rgued in Sec tion 3, b y
in v e st i ng the ￿rm l earns abou t ho wm uc h tim e and e￿ ort are ne eded to com pl ete the
inno v ation pro je ct. This learning e ￿e ct giv es R&D in v e st m en t a n extra v al ue be y o nd its
con tri bution to com ple tion o f the pro je ct a nd this ex tra v alue i ncreases w i th the lev el
of unc ertain t y . This incre a sed ext ra v alue is il lustrated in Figure 5 where th e d i sta nc e
be t w e en the ￿ = 1-curv e and the do tte dl ine incre a ses w i th g, and th us wi th the v ar i an c e
o f d K .
W e con c lude tha t u nde r uncertai n t y a n R&D in v estm en t g ran t has t w o p os i tiv ee ￿ e cts
on R&D in v estm e n t. T he ￿rst e￿ e ct is the ob vi ou s cost e ￿e ct,i .e. the go v e rn m en tp a ys
part o f the i n v e stm en t. T he second e￿ect is the l earni n g e￿e ct,i . e. dona ti o n of an
in v e st m en t g ran t giv es the ￿rm the o pp o r tu ni t y to incre as e R &D in v estm e n ts an d the
m ore a ￿rm c an i n v e st i n R&D, the f a ster it c an l e a rn a b out the i nno v at i o n pro ject.
Of course, on th e basis o f thi s ana l ysis w e cann ot conclude whethe ri tp a y s for the
go v e rn m en t to distri b ute s uc h a gran tt ot h e ￿ r m . T o a nsw e rt hi s question requi res
ano ther m od e lw i th the go v ernm e n ta sd e c ision m ak er. He re w e just fo cus on the optim al
resp o nse of a ￿rm to an e xog e no usly giv en g o v ernm en t pol icy .
4.2 R & D dep endi ng o n spi l lo v er b ene ￿t s.
Spil lo v er b e ne ￿ts are presen t when i t is p os sibl e fo r the ￿rm to tak e adv an ta ge of kno w-
le dg e generated outside the ￿rm b y com p eti to rs or uni v e rs i tie s. I n the c a s eo fR & D
￿rm s wil lh a v ed i ￿cul t y pre v e n ting thei r com p eti to rs from taki ng adv an ta ge of the m ore
general form so fs c i en ti ￿c and enginee ring kno wledge that are generated i n the course of
dev el op i n g so m es p e ci￿c pro duct or p ro cess. But, acc o rdi ng to Gro ssm an a nd He lpm an
(19 90 ) it is o fte n nec essa ry for the ￿rm to in v e s t resources i n order to capture th e se
spil lo v er b ene￿ts f ro m its c om pe titors a nd/o r from go v e rnm en ta l i n sti tutions li k e uni-
v ersiti es. Th e refore, b elo ww e assu m e tha t the ￿rm c a n o nly tak e adv an ta ge o f spill o v er
b ene￿ts a t m om e n ts that it in v e s ts in R&D.16
Of cours e , kno wledge created ou tsi de t h e ￿rm i ncreases o v er tim e. I fw ed e n ote the rate
of tec h nological de v e lop m en t outside the ￿rm b y w ( w> 0 and cons tan t) and re frain
form a n y uncertain ties, the state equation fo r K be com es
dK (t)=￿ I ( t ) e
w t
dt: (2 0)
He nce, a giv en re sea rc h outla y generates m o re cost re du c tion i f thi si n v estm e n tt a k es
place at a l at e r poi n to ft i m e, b ecause the ni t b ene￿ts from the tec h nological dev el op -
m e n t o utside the ￿rm up to thi sl at e r p oin to ft i m e .
I t i s c l e a r t h a t the com ple tion ti m e o f the R&D pro jec t b ecom e s tim ed e pe nd e n t. Th e re-
fore, the v alue of the inno v ation opp ortunit y equals
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The proble mi st os o l v e (2 1) sub je ct to e xpressions (4 ), (20 ) a nd K (T (t) )=0 . Li k e
b efore the ￿rm in v e st s m ax i m all yi n R&D if K i sl o w e r tha n a cri tic al l e v e l, but this
le v e li s n o wt i m e dep enden t. W ed e no te this cri tical le v e lb yK
￿
( t ). H ence ,f o r K< K
￿
( t )
t h e e x p e cted tota l o f R&D in v e st m en ts stil l to b e undertak e nt o com pl ete the pro je ct
dec reas e s with Re
wt






ds = K ( t ) : (2 2)
F rom (22 ) w ed e riv e the foll o wing ex press i on for the tim e tha t the pro je ct i sc om pl ete d:











Af ter s ubstit ut i on of (2 3) in to (2 1) w e get tha t




































(t);t )=0 : (2 5)





















F rom equation ( 26 ) w ec on c lude tha t K
￿
(t) gro w s exp on e n ti al ly o v e rt i m e .H e nc e, i fa t
presen t R&D i n v estm e n t is not o pti m al b e caus e K (t)i sh i g her than K
￿
(t), i t is stil l pos -
sibl e that i n v esting b ec om es optim al later b e caus e of thi se x p onen ti al i ncrease o f K
￿
(t).
The in tui tion b ehi nd thi si s c l ear: b y pos t pon i n g the R&D i n v estm en t to a later date the
in v e s tm en t g e ne ra te sm ore k no wl edg e b ecaus e then i t tak e sa d v an tag e o f the i ncreased
tec hno l og i cal dev elopm e n to v er ti m e.
In order to study the e￿ e ct of w on R&D in v estm en t, le tu sc o n c en trate on the i n v estm e n t
dec isiona tap a r t i cular tim e, sa ya tt =0 . I ti so p t i m al to in v est m axi m all yi nR & D
whenev er K fall s b elo w K
￿
(0). T os e ei nw h a tw a y R&D i n v estm en ts de pe n d on the
rate o f te c hnolog i cal dev el op m e n t w,w e di￿eren tiate K
￿





































A t ￿rst sigh t the sign o f dK
￿
(0 )=dw is no t cl ea r, since the ￿ rst te rm i s nega ti v e an d the
second term is p o siti v e . T he sec o nd term i s partic ularly i m p ortan ti fP is larg e .
In Figure 6 i ti s depic ted ho w K
￿
(0 ) d e pe nd s o n w ,w h e re the pa r am e ter v al ue s are
P =1 0 ; R=2 ; r =0 : 0 5, a nd, sinc ew e stud y the c ertain t yc a se, ￿ =0 . W ec on -
cl ude that here R &D i n v estm e n ts decre as e wi th w .T h i s ca n b e explai ne db y the fact
that k no wl edge creation d ue to a giv en researc h outla yi ncreases o v er ti m e with rate w .
Therefore, if w is l arg e ther e is a stro ng i ncen tiv e to p o stp o ne R&D in v e st m en ts, and
this of c o urse negativ ely a￿ects curren ti n v estm e n ts. Thi s result c o n￿rm s the w el l kno wn
m otiv ati o n p roble m o f R&D i n v estm en ts caus e db y spil lo v er b e ne ￿ts : an i nn o v ation c re-
ated b y one ￿rm pro vi des us able inform ation to other ￿rm sa tl ittl e or no costs. Whil e
all ￿ rm s s tand prepared to u se s uc h inform ation, no one ￿rm is wil ling to m ak e the
in v e st m en tn e cessary to pro duce it. A w a yt oo v ercom e this problem is gran ting pa te n ts18
for i nnov ati o ns, but this prev en ts th e di ￿ usion of inno v at i on s w hi c hi s u n d e si rab l e from
a w e lfar e poi n to fv i ew (Tirole (19 88)).
[ Place Fi g u r e 6 abou t here ].
Apparen tl y , under the para m eter v alues of P; R an d r that w e used throug hout the
who l e pap e r a n d on wh i c h Figure 6 i s ba sed, the ￿rst te rm of e quation (27 ) dom i na te s.
T h e sec on d t e rm b ec om es m ore i n￿uen ti a l for higher v al ue so f P an d i t i si n t eresting to
study f o r wh at v al ues of P; K
￿
(0) i ncreases wi th w .F ro m Fi g ure 7 w e obtain th at this
for i n stance ha pp ens when P = 1 00 0 a nd w is s u￿ cie n tly l o w . The e cono m ic in t ui tion
b ehind thi s is that when the pa y o￿ P i sv e ry l ar g e, the ￿rm i sv ery ea ger to o btain the
inno v ation. If w incre a ses th e ￿rm ￿nds a new p ersp e cti v e in the sense tha t it b ec om es
p o ssible to o btain the i nno v at i o n within a reaso nable am oun t of tim e, de sp i te o f the fact
that K m a y b e large. Th e refore, R& Di n v e st m en ts inc reas e wi th w .
[ Place Fi gu r e 7 abou t here ].
F or m o st sectors the rate o f tec hno l o gic al d e v el op m en t w wi ll li es o m ewhere b e t w ee n0
a n d 0.1. T he ab o v e ￿g ures s ho wt h a tK
￿
( 0 )is v e ry sensi tiv et o w when w is l o w. W ec on -
cl ude th at the ra te of tec hn ological dev el op m en t pla ys a n im p ortan tr o l ei nd e term ining
optim al R&D in v estm en t.
4.3 R & D when t he p a y o￿ d e creases o v er ti m e
In th i s sub se ction w e determ ine the optim al R&D in v e st m en t p oli cy of the ￿rm i n case
the p a y o￿ that accr ue s to the ￿rm a fte r the inno v at i o n pro j ect i s com pl eted, de creases
o v er tim e. T hi s ass um ption i sr e al istic f o r the foll owi ng t w o reaso ns.
Fi rs t, the so on e r the ￿rm com pl etes th e pro je ct the l o nger it captu r es m onop oly ren ts .
Sec o nd, the n um be ro fc o m p eti to rs, tha t a l ready has a c hie v e d the bre ak thro ugh in the
inno v ation pro c ess, wil l incr ea se o v er ti m e ,i m ply ing that com p eti tion i n the m ark e to f
the inno v ated pro duct also i nc reas e so v er tim e.
As in the prev ious subsecti on w e sim pli fy the a naly si sb y refraini n g from a n yu n c ertain-
tie s. Let us ass um e that the pa y o ￿ decl ine s at the ra te o f v ( v> 0 a nd c o nsta n t) o v er
tim e, so t h at the ￿rm rec eiv es Pe
￿ vt
i f the pro je ct is com ple ted a t ti m e t. This g radua l19
dec reas e of the pa y o￿ d i ￿e rs from Rei n gan um (1 982 ), where i tw as ass um ed that the
inno v ation pa y o￿ i s cons tan t u pt oap a r t i cul a r p oin to ft i m e a fte r whic hi t is zero. Our
as sum pti o n captures the a b o v er e a sons for a dec reas i ng pa y o￿ i na b e tter w a y .
The v a l ue o f the i nn o v ation o pp o rtuni t y b ecom e s
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The prob l em is to solv e (28 ) sub je ct to expre ss i on s ( 1) ( w i th ￿ = 0) , ( 2) , a n d
K ( T ( t ) )=0 .
S i n c e t h e p a y o￿ i s a functi on of t i m e, the sam eh o l ds for the cri tic al l ev e l K
￿
(t). I f
K (t) < K
￿
(t) the pro jec tw i ll b e com pl eted b yt i m e
T ( t ) = t + K = R : ( 2 9)
Subs t itution o f (29 ) i n to (28 ) e v en tua l ly l ead s to
F (K (t);t )=e






￿ R= r : (3 0)
Again w e obta i n K
￿
b y equating m arg i na l b e ne￿ts of R&D in v estm e n t( ￿ F
K
)t om arg i na l





(t );t )= 0 : (3 1)
Thec r i tical l ev el K
￿

















(0) ha s the sam ev alue as the cri tic a l lev el in the bas i cm o del. T o see how K
￿
(t )



































> 0 : (3 4)
He nce, K
￿
(t ) de creases o v er tim ei na c o n v ex w a y .T h e r e duction o f the pa y o￿ o v er tim e
m ak es i t less tem pti ng to p erform R&D in v estm en ts a s tim e pa sses.
In order to b e sure that a l s o here it i s o pti m al that the ￿rm i n v ests m axim al ly i n case
K (t) <K
￿
( t ), it nee ds to b e true tha t once K (t)i sb e l o w K
￿
( t ), i t rem ai ns b el o w K
￿
(t).
Otherwi se , the R&D in v estm e n ta tt i m et is w aisted do wn the d rai n, b e caus e the i nno -
v ation pro je ct w i ll n e v e rb ec o m pl eted. Th i si sb e c a use at the m om en t that K> K
￿
the
￿rm stops in v estm e n t, whic hi m pli es tha t K re m ains consta n t (rem e m b er that ￿ =0 ) .
Sinc e K
￿
is dec reas i ng the i nequali t y K> K
￿
con tin ues to ho l d so tha t the ￿rm will
nev er resum ei n v estm e n t. T he f ol lo wing propos i tion sho ws u nde r w hat pa ram e ter v al ues
the a b o v e descri be di n v e st m en t rule is sti ll op ti m al. He re it i si m p ortan t to notic e that
the ￿rm wil l nev er in v est in the i nn o v ation pro j ect if K (0) >K
￿
( 0) .
P r opo si t i o n 1.
Co nsi de r the in v e st m en t rul e I (t)=R wh e n K ( t ) ￿ K
￿
( t ), and I (t) = 0 otherwise.
When this r ul ei sa p p l ied an d K (0) ￿ K
￿
(0), then it ho l ds for ev e ry t>0 that K (t )
rem ai ns b elo w K
￿
(t ) when the para m eter v alues sa ti s fy the f ol lo wing inequali t y :
R
P
+ r> v : (3 5)
Pro of
See A pp endi x.
F rom (33 ) w e further obta i nt h a t
d ( dK
￿


































W e concl ude tha t a hea vy pa y o ￿ reducti on , i . e. v larg e ,l eads to a l a rge dec reas e o f K
￿
(t )
on an initi a l tim ei n te rv al .
5 C on cludin g rem ark s
In this pa p er w e studied o pti m al R&D in v estm e n t b eha v ior of a single ￿rm . An R&D
pro jec t tak es ti m et oc o m ple te a nd the a m ou n t of e￿o rt, m ateri al s and ti m e nee ded
to o btain the inno v at i on i s in general unc ertain. It m a y in fact not ev en b e p o ssibl e
to reali ze the pro jec t at all. Be ca use o f this unce rta i n t y , the fact th at m o st assets are
in ta ngibl e, and that the ￿rm i s reluc ta n tt o r e v e al an y pro jec t inform ation to o utside rs ,
R&D pro ject s are usua l ly ￿ nance db y retaine de a rni ng s of the ￿rm .T h e se features are
all c a ptured in our m o del .
The m o del is bas e do n P i ndyc k (19 93 ) ,i n w h i c hs e quen ti al i n v e st m en t pro gra m s under
cost unce rta i n t yw ere studied. W ec han ged s om e of the features of Pindyc k’ sm od e ls o
that i tb e cam em o re suit a ble fo r studyi n g R&D in v estm en ts. F or R&D pro j ects it holds
that t ec hn i cal uncer ta i n t yi sf a rm ore i m p o rtan t than input cos t unce rta i n t y , and this
tec hnic a l unce rta i n t yi s esp e ci al ly signi￿can tw h e n the pro ject is fa r from b ei ng com -
ple ted. Therefore, com pared to P i ndyc k (19 93), w e left o ut i npu t cos t unc ertain t y , and
w em a de tec hnical unc ertain t y larger during earli er phas e s of the pro je ct i n ste ad o f
uncert ai n t yb e ing the sam e f or al l phases as w a s the case i n Pindyc k (199 3). I nc lusion
of thi sl a st feature turned o ut to h a v ea l ar ge pos i tiv ei m p act on R& Di n v e st m en ts.
Lik e Pindyc k (1 993 ), Ka nniai ne n (19 93 ), a nd Gross m a n a nd Shapiro (19 86 ), w e also
found that R&D in v estm en ti ncreases w i th uncertain t y . The reaso n i s that b yi n v esting
the ￿rm g e ts m ore i nfo rm at i on abou t t h e ac tua l tota l o f in v estm e n ts that needs to b e
undertak e n to ￿nish the pro je ct. Generating th i se x tra inform ation g i v e s a n extra v al ue
to i n v esting. N ot i ce that in the certain t y case ev erythi ng is kno wn b eforehand so that
then the ext ra v al ue is zer o, be c a use there i sn oe xtra i nfo r m at ion to b e ga i ned.
In K a nniaine n (1 993 ) the R&D pro ce s s generates an im m edi a te return i n the form of
inc reas e d pro duc tivi t y of the c ap i ta l sto c k. This i sc on tr a ry to our a pproa c h, where i t
tak e s tim et oc om pl ete an R&D pro jec ta n dap a y o￿ is only ob tai ne d after c om pleti on .
In Gro ssm ann a nd Sh apiro (19 86 ) R&D in v estm en ts ha v ed e creasing re turns and the re
is no ￿na nci ng lim it, whil e in our m o del i n v estm e n ts ha v ec o nstan t returns and the22
in v e st m en t rate ca nnot ex ceed the upp erb oun d that com e sf ro m the fact that R&D is
￿na nc edb yr e ta i ned earnings. Co nseq ue n tly , in Gross m a nn and S hapiro (19 86 ) the rate
of i n v estm en td i ￿e rs o v er tim e, whi le in our solution the ￿ rm e ithe ri n v ests m axi m all y
in R&D o r i n v e sts nothing at a l l.
F urtherm or e ,w e studied th e e￿ect so f i n v estm en tg r an ts, spill o v er b ene￿ts, a nd a de-
cre as i ng p a y o ￿ on R&D i n v e stm en ts . B esides t he o b vi o us dec reas i ng cos t e￿ e ct, a second
p o siti v ee ￿ e ct o f i n v estm en t gran ts i sc a used b y add i tiona l learning. The presence of in-
v estm en t gra n ts m ak es it p o ssibl ef o r the ￿rm to incre a se its i n v e st m en tr a t e , an d the
higher this in v estm e n tr a t e , th e faster it can l earn ab out t he R & D pro ject. Spill o v er
b ene￿ts g i v e the ￿rm an i ncen tiv e to p ostp one R&D in v estm en ts, b e caus e w he n the ￿ r m
in v e s ts later i t gener a tes a higher re turn due to the o v erall tec hno l og i ca l de v el op m en t.
Ho w ev e r, i nc as e o f a v e ry l arg e pa y o￿ a n d sp i ll o v e r b ene￿ts it can b e op ti m al to un-
dertak e R&D in v estm e n ts, whil e without s pi ll o v er b ene ￿t s i tw ou l d b e optim a l to i n v est
noth i ng a t all . This i sb e c a use s pi ll ov er b e ne ￿ts g i v e the ￿rm the opp ortunit yt oc o m -
p le te a pro j ect without needi ng to use to o m an yr e s ource s . As ti m e pass e s, m ore other
￿rm s wil l obta i n the i nn o v ation tha t th e ￿rm i sw o rki ng on. Th e refore, the pa y o￿ o f an
R&D pro j ect wil li ng e neral decre as e o v er tim e . Thi s causes the ￿rm to decre a se R&D
in v e s tm en ts as ti m e pa sses.
An in te resting topic fo r futu re researc hw ould b e to rel ax the a ssum ption that the pro￿t
￿o wo b t ai ne d from other o p erations within the ￿rm is c o nstan t. Then w e could analyz e
whether it w ould pa y for the ￿rm to del ay i n v estm en ti nR & D for an i niti al i n terv al of
tim ei n order to accum ulate retained p ro￿ts and then to i n v e st m ore agressiv ely . It see m s
that i nr e al w or l d ￿rm sd oi nf a c t som eti m e s resort to suc ha n i n v estm en t strategy .23
App endix
In this ap p endi x the p r o o fo fP r opos i tion 1 is g i v e n.
F i r st , n oti ce tha t i fi th o l ds th at K (t ) <K
￿
( t ) 8 t>0 w hen K (0) = K
￿
(0), the n this
wil la l so hold fo r K (0) <K
￿
(0). So , let us de pa rt from the situation that
K (0) = K
￿
(0): (38 )













( t ) 8 t> 0i m pli es that I (t)= R .I f w e s ubstitute this in to (3) (wi th ￿ =0 )
w e o b t a i n b y us i ng (39 ):










F rom (32 ) and (40 ) w ec a n deri v e that K (t) <K
￿















< 0 : (4 1)
If w ed e no te the l eft-ha nd side of (4 1) b y f (t), w ec a n rewri te (3 8) a s
f (0 ) = 0 : (4 2)
F rom (41 ) w e obta i n that
f
0
(t)= ￿ r + v= (1 + Re
vt
=r P ): (4 3)
Satisfa c tion of ( 41 ) r e quire s tha t f
0
(0) < 0 whi c h is the case un de re xpression (35 ). I f
(35 ) holds, w eg e t fro m (4 3) tha t f
0
(t) < 0 8 t>0a sw el l. A nd thi si n turn i m pli es
that (41) holds 8 t> 0. Q. e. d.24
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Fi g ure options
Fi g ure 1:
The cri tic a l lev el K
￿
a s functi on o f ￿ under the para m eter v alues ￿ =0 : 1 ;r =0 : 05 ;R =2
a n d P =1 0 .
F i g ure 2:
The cri tical l ev el K
￿
as func tion of ￿ under the pa r am e ter v alues ￿ =1 ;r =0 : 05 ;R =2
and P = 10.
Fi g ure 3:
The cri tical l ev el K
￿
as functi o n of the di sc ou n t rate r f or ￿ =0 a n d ￿ =1 ,w h e re
￿ =0 : 1 ;R = 2 an d P = 10.
Fi g ure 4:
The crit ical le v e l K
￿
a s function o f the upp e r ￿nancing li m it R for ￿ =0 a n d￿ =1 ,
where ￿ =0 : 1 ;r =0 : 05 an d P =1 0 .
F i g u r e 5:
The criti cal le v e l K
￿
as f un c tion of the i n v estm e n t g ran tr a t eg fo r ￿ = 0 and ￿ =1 ,
where ￿ =0 : 1 ;R =2 ;r =0 : 0 5 and P =1 0 . The do tte dl i ne is dra wn s uc h that
(1 ￿ g )( K
￿
j
g =0; ￿ =1
)i s consta n t.
Fi g ure 6:
The c riti cal l ev el K
￿
(0) as functi o n of t h e rate of tec h nological dev elopm e n t outside the
￿rm w , where P =1 0 ;R =2 ;r =0 : 05 and ￿ =0 .
Fi g ure 7:
The c riti cal l ev el K
￿
(0) as functi o n of t h e rate of tec h nological dev elopm e n t outside the
￿rm w fo r P = 1 00 an d P = 10 00, wh e re R =2 ;r =0 : 05 an d ￿ =0 .